The topic of cybersecurity usually brings to mind data breaches that impact financial or private information, stolen intellectual property or disruption of major events such as political elections. But even more severe threats exist, including cyberterrorism. Industrial leaders, in particular, need to be aware of the situation because of the risks associated with operating a plant. Power, gas and hydrocarbon derivatives are all essential to daily existence today, yet each of these resources involves highly dangerous processes that, if compromised, could become major weapons of cyberwarfare.

The association gained two new leaders last fall: Heather Rhoderick, who is VMA’s new president, and Bryan Burns, chairman of the board. They share their views and goals.

Many names have been given to the current state of technology in manufacturing including the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and Industry 4.0. No matter the name, what’s happening is garnering many headlines today.1 The general goal of the new methodologies is to use sensors, data, artificial intelligence and other current tools to increase manufacturing productivity and profitability.

From time to time VALVEmagazine.com will open up the archives and re-publish some of our most popular articles from years past. This first appeared on April 25, 2017.

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In October of 2016, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released its findings into the tragic 2013 explosion and fire at the Williams Olefin Plant in Geismar, LA that killed two workers and injured 167.

The incident occurred during non-routine operational activities that introduced heat to the reboiler, which was offline and isolated from its pressure relief device. The heat increased the temperature of a liquid propane mixture confined within the reboiler, resulting in a dramatic pressure rise within the vessel. The reboiler shell ruptured catastrophically, causing a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion and fire (Figure 1).

The CSB investigation revealed deficiencies in the plant’s safety culture that resulted (among other things) in failure to manage appropriately or review effectively two significant changes. These changes introduced new hazards involving the reboiler that ruptured. The first was installation of block valves that could isolate the reboiler from its protective pressure relief device. The second was the administrative controls Williams relied upon to control the position (open or closed) of those block valves.